just continued the trend towards the massification

24/08/17 1 ž In our last lecture we started examining the evolution of war in the post-WWII years, concentrating on the development of WMD in the Cold War; ž To some degree, the development of nuclear weapons just continued the trend towards the massification of war; ž However, even while states entered nuclear arms races with one another, they also sought to develop new political mechanisms that would prevent nuclear Armageddon; ž Today, we shall trace some of these political responses. We shall see how a “new” security threat – nuclear war – led to the evolution of political institutions and ideas about security. Soon after the development and use of nuclear weapons by the Untied States, the technology spread ž The USSR tested a weapon in 1949 ž Britain in 1952 ž France in 1960 ž China 1967 More recently: ž Israel is believed to have developed the capacity in the late 1960s ž India tested in 1974 ž Pakistan in 1998 ž North Korea in 2006 › https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJe7fY-yowk 3 ž In all cases, the stated purpose of the development of nuclear weapons has been deterrence – to deter others from using aggression (see “no first use” policies); ž However, from the first years of nuclear technology, people have debated the political implications of such weapons; ž Early debate – especially amongst academics and nuclear physicists – focused on the possibility of international control of such weapons, possibly through the UN; ž Why? To give a central global authority the monopoly on the use of force that would allow it to prevent any future war between states. 4 24/08/17 2 ž We have already seen a case of revolutionary political change resulting from the evolution of the use of force; ž The Napoleonic Wars led to this change, but it can best be seen in the examples of Germany and Italy; ž In both cases, fragmented political communities were overwhelmed, and new national-states were formed (1870 and 1871); ž Could the nuclear revolution produce the rise of global authority and the demise of the sovereign state? ž At least so far, sovereign states have proven unwilling to give up their autonomy and hand nuclear weapons to a global government; ž Instead, the key efforts to address WMD have been undertaken through cooperation between countries; ž This cooperation takes many different forms. Two key dimensions of such cooperation include: › Is the cooperation formal or informal? › Is the cooperation institutionalised or not? 6 Formal or informal? ž Some cooperation is formalised through the creation of binding treaties or international laws; ž Some cooperation is informal, and operates based on norms – unwritten rules – that shape states’ expectations and actions. To institution or not? ž Some cooperation is carried out through the creation and operation of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); ž Some cooperation is carried out merely between states – there is no institution created. 1. The reduction of tension between nuclear adversaries; 2. The prevention of proliferation; 3. The promotion of disarmament. 1. E.g. the PTBT (1963); the “hotline” agreement (1963); the INF treaty (1987). 2. E.g. the nuclear NPT (1967); the NSG (1974); the MTCR (1987); SALT I (1973) and II (1979); BWC (1975); CWC (1997). 3. E.g. the NPT (1967); START I (1991), II (1993) and III (2010). 8 24/08/17 3 ž This is the best-known and, arguably, the most important arms control treaty in existence ž However, it also helps us to highlight many of the controversies over arms control and the politics of WMD ž Finally, it is important because contemporary efforts to address the challenge of WMD generally centre on this treaty/mechanism and its limitations 9 ž The treaty was a response to fears regarding the further spread of nuclear technology; ž It opened for ratification after China had tested a weapon, and therefore in a world in which 5 states already had nuclear weapons ž It was designed to gain maximum support, and so it contained provisions promoting the following three objectives: › The prevention of proliferation; › The promotion of disarmament; › The legitimation of peaceful nuclear technology 10 ž The NPT has existed for 45 years and has expanded in importance during that period, having now been signed by 190 countries ž Compliance is overseen by a well-funded and influential body – the IAEA – and can be (and has been) enforced by the UN Security Council ž All “new” nuclear weapons states are not signatories ž The BWC emerged in 1975 and has 165 signatories ž There is no compliance mechanism and no effective enforcement mechanism ž Recent efforts to strengthen the convention and to develop an enforcement mechanism failed due to unwillingness of key states to accept compliance rules 11 ž The NPT has not prevented proliferation – which has merely occurred outside the treaty; ž Has the NPT promoted disarmament on a significant scale amongst the existing nuclear weapons states? ž The enforcement mechanism of the NPT (UNSC) cannot enforce disarmament given that the existing nuclear weapons states are also veto-wielding members; ž The NPT does not address the problem of non-state actors gaining nuclear weapons. 12 24/08/17 4 ž The NPT explicitly allows states to withdraw, and those that are not bound by the NPT are not bound to accept investigation by the IAEA…e.g. North Korea; ž However: › Firstly, it has been argued that a norm has emerged – aided by the NPT – that suggests that nuclear proliferation is illegitimate. Most would agree that NK has breached this norm; › Secondly, states and the UNSC can still act against proliferating states that are not signatories to the NPT. For example, the US, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea have cooperated regarding resolution of the NK issue › Finally, the IAEA can conduct investigations of non-NPT signatories if they agree. This has been pursued with NK 13 ž The original deal in the NPT was that non-nuclear states would give up the chance to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for nuclear-armed states agreeing to disarm; ž How’s that going? › The UK has reduced its arsenal, but has committed to updating its delivery systems (Trident); › The US has greatly reduced its arsenal, but has committed to modernising its warheads and has published plans for the broader use of nuclear weapons – officially it refuses to renounce nuclear weapons until threats to it are gone; › Russia has reduced its arsenal but has made no recent attempt to disarm; › China and France remain opaque regarding their arsenals and intentions 14 ž Firstly, the NPT is not directed at the prevention of the spread of nuclear technology to non-state actors; ž Secondly, this has occurred – the A. Q. Khan network is often referred to as an example of a transnational organisation engaged in the transfer of this technology; ž Thirdly, the combination of nuclear technology with terrorism is a widely feared possibility – it has been at the forefront of US security policy, for example, since the 1990s. 15 ž While debates about disarmament have stagnated and dragged, debates about how to handle non-state proliferation have been much more constructive; ž This is a place of agreement for most big states and all nuclear weapons states (except NK); ž The concern has been how to strengthen global governance structures so that they can monitor and regulate the flow of technology and materials across and within states; ž In addition, a growing complex of inter-governmental bodies has emerged in order to combat transnational criminal and terrorist organizations; ž This has generated a growing density of structures designed to prevent nuclear terrorism, but these structures have no clear apex and no coherent organisation. 16 24/08
/17 5 ž There are two major tensions here: › The promotion of global efforts to address proliferation and disarmament has been slowed by disagreement amongst states that really boils down to a question of fairness – why should some states give up nuclear weapons when others have them? › The second tension is about the challenge of terrorism plus WMD. This problem has encouraged the emergence of regional and global governance structures, and tension exists regarding the relationship between their power and their legitimacy. 17 ž Have efforts to prevent proliferation been effective? ž Have efforts to disarm the great powers been effective? ž Is disarmament desirable? ž How should we manage internationally the threat of non-state actors and nuclear weapons? ž And, from the reading, is proliferation a threat?

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